Post-conflict International Humanitarian Law Obligations Regarding Post-mortem Handling of Dead Soldiers Left in Combat Area. : The case of the 2008-2010 searches for remains of fallen Norwegian Waffen SS volunteers left after the Kaprolat/Hasselmann incident June 1944. by Aksnes, Mari Sørensen
 Post-conflict International Humanitarian Law Obligations 
Regarding Post-mortem Handling of Dead Soldiers Left in 
Combat Area. 
 
The case of the 2008-2010 searches for remains of fallen Norwegian Waffen SS 
volunteers left after the Kaprolat/Hasselmann incident June 1944. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Student number: 167925 
 
Supervisor: Kai Krüger 
 
Number of words: 14 990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Table of contents 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………….....3 
1.1. The purpose of the thesis……………………………………………………….................................3 
1.2 The Kaprolat/Hasselmann incident……………………………………………………………………..4 
1.3 The structure of the thesis……………………………………………………….................................4 
2. Preliminary considerations………………………………………………………………………………….5 
2.1 What is International Humanitarian Law?.....................................................................................5 
2.2 The sources of international humanitarian law……………………………………….......................6 
2.3 State obligations…………………………………………………………………………………………11 
3. Which IHL obligations are posed on the respective States regarding the remains of the 
Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers who died during combat actions in the Russian Karelia in 
1944?......................................................................................................................................................12 
3.1 The State obligations under international humanitarian law regarding post-mortem handling      
of soldiers left in combat area……………………………………………………………………………...12 
3.1.1 The obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead and to prevent them from      
being despoiled………………………………………………………………………..………………..12 
3.1.2 Obligations with a view to the identification of the dead………………………...…………...13 
3.1.3 The obligation to dispose of the dead in a respectful manner…........................................15 
3.1.4 The obligation to endeavour to facilitate the return the remains and to return the     
personal effects of the deceased……………………………………………………………………...17 
3.2 The obligations’ scope of application………………………………………………………………….20 
3.2.1 Do the obligations apply to the remains of the Norwegian soldiers in German war 
service?.......................................................................................................................................20 
3.2.2 Do the obligations apply post-conflict?..............................................................................21 
3.2.3 Are Russia, Germany and Norway bound by the obligations?..........................................23 
3.2.4 Can the obligations as they are construed today be applied with regard to the remains     
of soldiers who died in 1944?......................................................................................................27 
3.2.4.1 The principle of no retroaction…………………………………………………………27 
3.2.4.2 Applicability of obligations that explicitly addresses historical events………........28 
3.2.4.3 Applicability of obligations entered into during a continuing wrongful act………..29 
 2 
3.3 Enforcement of the obligations………………………………………………………………………...33 
4. Have the States by recent activities been acting in accordance with their international 
humanitarian law obligations regarding the dead?............................................................................34 
4.1 Clarification of what actions are required in the Kaprolat/Hasselmann area……………………..34 
4.2 Relevant activities 2007 – 2010………………………………………………………………………..35 
4.2.1 Actions by the Kaprolat committee……………………………………………………………..35 
4.2.2 The Norwegian government’s actions………………………………………………………….36 
4.2.3 Actions by the Russian and German authorities……………………………………………...37 
5. Summary and conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………37 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………...........................41 
Annex 
Annex I – Map of the Karelia region……………………………………………………………………….46 
Annex II – Map of the Kaprolat/Hasselmann area……………………………………………………….47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The purpose of the thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and clarify the obligations international humanitarian 
law poses on Russia,1 Germany and Norway2 regarding the remains of the Norwegian Waffen 
SS soldiers3
 
 who died during combat actions in the Russian Karelia in 1944.  
The problem for discussion has its background in experiences made by the Norwegian 
Kaprolat Committee. In 2005 several mortal remains were localised in the Kaprolat and 
Hasselmann area in Russian Karelia (location shown on map). From death marks and other 
equipment found next to the remains, it became clear that the remains belonged to Norwegian 
Waffen SS soldiers who died during the Second World War. On the basis of this knowledge 
the Kaprolat Committee was established by professor Stein Ugelvik Larsen4
 
 with the 
objective to put an end to the tragic episode in the Karelia region. The Committee appealed to 
the Norwegian and Russian authorities in order to arrange for the search, collection, 
identification and repatriation of the remains. It proved however difficult to get the State’s 
authorities on board.  
The same year as the remains of the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers were found, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a memo dealing with the possibility of 
existing legal obligations for Norway and Russia regarding the remains. The memo concluded 
that no such legal obligation existed.5 According to the Norwegian authorities at the time the 
identification and burial of the remains should be seen as a German responsibility, while the 
return of the remains would be a private matter.6
                                                 
1 As successor of the Soviet Union. 
  
2 In this thesis Norway is considered as a belligerent State under the Allied Parties during the Second World War 
(at least in June 1944). Norwegian courts sentenced Norwegian volunteer SS soldiers who fought in Russian 
Karelia for providing help for Germany during a war in which Norway participated cf. the Norwegian Criminal 
Code section 86 cf. e.g. Rt. 1945/365. 
3 Classified as traitors under Norwegian criminal law (see note 2) and thus formally classified as enemies to the 
Allied Parties. 
4 Expert on Norwegian war history and Professor Emeritus at the Institute of Comparative Politics at the 
University of Bergen. 
5 Norwegian Minestry of Foreign Affairs, internal memo ‘Funn av levninger etter norske frontkjempere i 
Russland’ Case no. 05/08348 Document no. 22. 
6 Letter from Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik’s office to chairman of the Kaprolat Committee, professor 
Stein Ugelvik Larsen (2005). 
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1.2 The Kaprolat/Hasselmann incident 
The obligations regarding the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers who died during the 
Kaprolat/Hasselmann incident is the topic for discussion. The Norwegian Waffen SS skiing 
company, later to be transformed to the Waffen SS skiing battalion (‘skijegerbataljonen’), was 
established as a part of the German forces during the summer of 1942. The battalion’s 
objective was to defend Finland against the Soviet Union.7 From February 1944 the battalion 
was stationed in what is now Russian Karelia on two elevations in the terrain which 
functioned as outposts. These elevations were named Kaprolat and Hasselmann after two 
German officers.8
 
  
In May 1944 Soviet troops started to escalate. The Norwegian battalion, on the other hand, 
was strongly reduced due to the fact that a lot of the soldiers were granted leave or dismissed 
during the summer. In June merely 200 soldiers were left in the two locations to defend the 
outposts against some thousand attacking Soviet soldiers.9 In the time space 25 to 27 June, the 
German/Norwegian defenders were overrun by the largely outnumbering Soviet forces.10
 
 
Although a few combatants from the Norwegian battalion managed to escape and make their 
way back to safe territories on the German side, the majority of the battalion was either 
imprisoned or killed and left on the battlefield. The bodies of the approximately 110 
Norwegian SS soldiers who died during the Soviet attack on Kaprolat and Hasselmann were 
not buried then and have since 1944 been left in the open, subject to animals, scavengers and 
incidental Russian excavating. The question for discussion is thus whether the involved States 
are in any way obligated to ensure a humane treatment of the remains. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
Before determining which obligations international humanitarian law (IHL) poses on the 
States concerning the remains I want to clarify what IHL is, what are its sources and how 
these sources create obligations for the States. These matters will be discussed in chapter 2. In 
chapter 3.1 I attempt to identify which obligations States have under international 
                                                 
7 Erik Veum De som falt: Nordmenn drept i tysk krigstjeneste 2ed (2009) 156-157. 
8 Norske digitale kilder 1940-1945 ’Kaprolat’ Available at: http://www.nordiki.no/kaprolat.htm [Accessed 22 
November 2010]. 
9 Veum (note 7) at 159 - 160 
10 ‘Tagesbefehl: The official German rapport on the events’. Available at: http://www.nordiki.no/Tagesbefehl.jpg 
[Accessed 15 September 2010]. 
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humanitarian law regarding soldiers who die on the battlefield. The question of whether these 
obligations apply to our specific scenario is discussed in chapter 3.2. In chapter 3.3 I briefly 
consider the matter of the obligations’ enforcement. Chapter 4 seeks to clarify what specific 
actions are required by the States under their IHL obligations and whether the States by recent 
activities have in fact been acting in accordance with these obligations. In chapter 5 I 
summarise and conclude. 
2. Preliminary clarifications 
2.1 What is International Humanitarian Law? 
The theme of the thesis is obligations under international humanitarian law. International 
humanitarian law is a branch of international law, also known as the laws of armed conflicts 
or the laws of war. IHL comprises all those rules of international law which are designed to 
regulate the treatment of individuals in international armed conflicts.11 The area of law has its 
origin in the customary practices of armies, but a universal codification began in the 
nineteenth century.12  Since then, States have agreed to a series of practical rules, based on the 
experiences gained in war. These rules strike a careful balance between humanitarian 
concerns and the military requirements of States, with the objective to limit the effects of 
armed conflicts. International humanitarian law protects persons who are not or are no longer 
participating in the hostilities, and restricts the means and methods of warfare.13
 
 
The driving force behind the development of IHL is the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), funded in 1863. The ICRC has been the initiator to the conclusions of the 
many Hague and Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.14
 
  
International humanitarian law is not to be confused with international human rights law 
which also strives to protect individuals, albeit from a different angle. While IHL mainly 
applies during armed conflicts, human rights law applies in principle at all times, i.e. both in 
                                                 
11 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I: 
Rules (2005) xxvi. 
12 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) xxv. 
13 ICRC Advisory service on international humanitarian law ‘What is International Humanitarian Law?’ 
Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/humanitarian-law-factsheet.htm  
[Accessed 22 November 2010]. 
14 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) xxvi. 
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peacetime and in situations of armed conflict. The difference becomes clearer by the fact that 
some human rights treaties permit governments to derogate from certain rights during armed 
conflicts.15
 
 
Although international humanitarian law regulates the treatment of all individuals in 
international armed conflicts, this thesis is delimitated to IHL concerning the dead. In time of 
peace, States decide for themselves how they want to act when their nationals die abroad.16
 
 
When soldiers die during time of war, on the other hand, States must respect the obligations 
entered into under IHL in order to protect the dead. 
The main consideration behind the specific rules concerning the dead is ‘the right of the 
families to know the fate of their relatives.’17 Consequently, it is important to inform the 
family of the location of their dead relatives. To make this possible, every party to a conflict 
has to try to collect information that will aid the identification of dead bodies. Moreover, 
mortal remains must be respected, buried decently and gravesites marked.18
2.2 The sources of international humanitarian law 
 
Obligations under international humanitarian law are created through the sources of IHL.19 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)20 Article 38 ‘…is generally regarded as 
a complete statement of the sources of international law.’21
 
 Its paragraph 1 provides that:  
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply: 
 
                                                 
15 ICRC Advisory service on international humanitarian law ‘International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law’. Available at: www.ehl.icrc.org/images/resources/pdf/ihl_and_ihrl.pdf [Accessed on 26 
November 2010] 
16 The Norwegian Foreign Services shall in accordance with the Statute of the Foreign Services Section 1 give 
Norwegian citizens abroad support in relation to deaths. It is however within the Foreign Services administrative 
discretion to decide what this support entails.   
17 Cf. Article 33(1) of Protocol I. 
18 Marco Sassòli and Antoine A. Bouvier How does Law Protect in War? Volume I 2ed (2006) 170-171. 
19 ILC ’Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) 
YILC, vol. II, Part Two, p 55, para. 3. 
20 The Statute of the ICJ Article 36(1) provides that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the 
parties refer to it...’  The ICJ’s function is to decide in accordance with international law, and thus also 
international humanitarian law, international disputes submitted to it by States cf. Articles 34(1) and 38(1). 
Article 93(1) of the United Nations Charter provides that all members of the Organization are ipso facto parties 
to the Statute of the Court. 
21 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 7ed (2008) 5. 
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(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting States; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions in Article 59 [which states that the decisions of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case], judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rule of law. 
 
According to Article 38(a) international conventions are a source of international law. The 
conventions establish rules expressly recognized by the contesting States. This entails that 
only States that have taken the necessary steps in order to bring the convention into force are 
bound by its terms.22
 
 The most important conventions on international humanitarian law are 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Of importance are also the two Additional Protocols to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions which were concluded in 1977. When it comes to establishing 
obligations regarding soldiers who die in the field, the most important treaties are the I 
Geneva Convention of 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded Armies in 
the Field and its Additional Protocol I. 
Although the term ‘international conventions’ often is associated with multilateral law making 
treaties, also bilateral agreements can be a source of international humanitarian treaty law.23 
These bilateral treaties are, of course, only binding upon the parties which have agreed to their 
terms. In 1992 Germany and Russia concluded an agreement concerning German and Russian 
war dead and war graves on the adverse party’s territory.24
                                                 
22 International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative ‘What is IHL?’ Available at: 
 It might be argued that the 
Norwegian SS volunteers are to be included in the interpretation of ‘German war dead’ in 
accordance with the agreement’s Article 2(a). However, the agreement only establishes 
obligations for the States with regard to the opposing party’s war dead. Thus, while Germany 
is in accordance with Article 3(3) obligated to tend to and maintain Russian war graves on 
German territory, the agreement does not pose any obligations on Germany regarding the 
German war dead. Moreover, the only obligation the agreement establishes for Russia 
http://ihl.ihlresearch.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=2083 [accessed 23 November 2010].  
23 Brownlie (note 21) at 14. 
24 The German-Russian agreement Article 1. 
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concerning German war dead is to allow German authorities to establish war graves on 
Russian territory.25
 
 
Article 38(b) establishes international customs as a source of international law. While 
conventions only bind States that have expressly agreed to their terms, customary 
international humanitarian law is binding upon all States. 
 
In 1995 the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent invited the 
ICRC to prepare a report on the customary rules of international humanitarian law.26 The 
ICRC published its study consisting of 161 customary international humanitarian rules in 
March 2005. The study is based on an ‘extensive and thorough research into national, 
international and ICRC sources, which was carried out by a mix of national and international 
research teams, a steering committee of scholars and the ICRC research team. The practice 
collected was evaluated by academic and governmental experts.’27
 
  
The Study in itself is not a source of law and is thus not formally binding on the States.28 
However, the objective of the Study has been to identify the rules that already bind all States 
in armed conflicts.29
 
 Insofar as the ICRC has succeeded in this objective, the rules are thus 
binding on all States as customary law cf. the ICJ statute Article 38(b). 
In consistency with the statute and jurisprudence of the ICJ, the ICRC defined customary law 
as practically uniform, extensive and representative State practice accepted as law.30 To make 
sure that the study was representative the ICRC consulted widely with governmental and 
other experts in their personal capacity during its research. The governmental experts were 
also consulted one last time, prior to the publishing of the Study, to make certain that the 
study was legally accurate.31
                                                 
25 The German-Russian agreement Article 3(2). 
 This suggests that the study in fact is a correct statement of 
26 Frits Kalshovden Constraints on the waging of war: an introduction to international humanitarian law 2ed 
(2001) 16 and Malcom MacLaren and Felix Schwendimann ‘An Exercise in the Development of International 
Law: The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ GLJ (2005) Vol. 6 No. 9 p 1217 at p 
1235. 
27 MacLaren and Schwendimann (note 26) at p 1235  
28 Statement by Judge Christopher G. Weeramantry, Judge, International Court of Justice in ‘the Report on the 
ICRC-AALCO Conference on custom as a source of humanitarian law’, (2005) 5. Available at: 
www.aalco.int/ICRC-AALCO%20Conferece%208-9December%202005.pdf  [Accessed 23 November 2010] 
29 MacLaren and Schwendimann (note 26) at p 1222 
30 Henckaerts and  Doswald-Beck (note 11) at xxxvi 
31 MacLaren and Schwendimann (note 26) at p 1239 
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customary international humanitarian law, and that the rules in the study thus are binding on 
all States.32
 
 In this thesis I will assume that the Study is binding on the States as a 
manifestation of customary international humanitarian law. 
There is a dynamic relationship between treaty IHL and customary IHL which makes it 
important to regard both when applying this set of law. When taken together, the international 
humanitarian conventions cover much of IHL. Yet these treaties do not (alone or all together) 
cover the entire international humanitarian law. Thus, when applying treaty provisions one 
must confer the customary law to make sure that one is seeing the entire picture. On the other 
hand, the IHL treaties sometime introduce completely new provisions, creating new 
international humanitarian law. In time, the result can be modification of the customary 
international law. In the meantime however there will be a discrepancy between the two 
sources of law making it important to regard the treaty IHL while applying customary IHL.33
 
 
According to Article 38(c) of the Statute, general principles of law are also a primary source 
of international law. It has been argued that although the general principles of law have a 
function in the application of law, the principles are by themselves too imprecise to provide a 
satisfactory basis for decision.34 General principles of law may first be understood as those 
principles of domestic law which are common to all legal orders. Secondly, general principles 
of international humanitarian law are those principles specific to IHL.35 Some of these 
principles are the principle of humanity36
                                                 
32 Although the Study has been criticised it has been invoked in both international and national jurisprudence. 
Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura notes 54, 55, 56, 74, 95, 96 and 99 cited in Theodor 
Meron ‘Editorial Comment: Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’, (2005) 99 AJIL 817 at 834, United 
States, Supreme Court, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence, et al., Case No. 05-184. 29 June 2006, p. 69. 
See also Israel, The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice, Adalah and others v. GOC Central 
Command, IDF and others, 23 June 2005, HCJ 3799/02 paras. 20, 21 and 24, and The Public Committee against 
Torture in Israel and others v. The Government of Isreal and others, 13 December 2006, HCJ 769/02, paras. 23, 
29-30 and 41-42 cf. Jean-Marie Henckaerts ‘Customary International Law: a response to US comments’ (2007) 
89 International Review of the Red Cross p 473 at p 487 note 54. Also legal scholars generally seem to rely on 
the rules in the study e.g. Arne Willy Dahl Håndbok i militær folkerett 2ed (2008) 26 and Jann K. Klefner 
‘Protection of the Wounded, Sick, and shipwrecked’ p 325 in Dieter Fleck The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 2ed (2008) 338. For criticism of the study see Ian Scobbie ‘The approach to customary 
international la in the study’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau Perspectives on the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (2007) 15 at 16 and The ASIL ‘United States Responds to ICRC 
Study on Customary International Law’ AJIL (2007) Vol. 101 No. 3 p 639. 
, the principle of necessity and the principle of 
33 Yoram Dinstein Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2004) 7. 
34 Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process: International law and how we use it (1994) 222 
35 Sassòli and Bouvier (note 18) at 138-139 
36 Particularly as expressed in the so called Marents clause which was first introduced in the preamble of the 
Hague Convention No. II of 1899. 
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proportionality. These principles often have to be taken into consideration when interpreting 
IHL rules.37
 
  
Thus, Arne Willy Dahl argues that the principle of military necessity has to be considered as 
an element of interpretation as to how far a State’s obligations reach. He validates this 
statement with historic examples: The second Geneva Convention Article 18 states that the 
‘…Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to search for and 
collect the shipwrecked…’ In spite of this it has in retrospect been deemed as legitimate that 
the HMS Dorsetshire in May 1941, out of concern for own safety, left several hundred 
survivors after Bismarck sank. This because members of the crew had received notification of 
a submarine being observed in the water. For the same reasons the submarine HMS 
Conqueror’s omission in 1982 to emerge to save survivors after General Belgrano, have been 
deemed legitimate. Thus the words ‘all possible measures’ must be interpreted as ‘all military 
possible measures’.38
 
 
The principle of military necessity is however not a very relevant factor of interpretation 
several years after a conflict has ended. On the other hand, it would be onerous, and thus 
probably not in accordance with the drafters of the IHL conventions’ intentions, to construe 
all obligations as being absolute where another intention is not expressly stated. However, in 
similarity to the principle of military necessity, the principle of proportionality has been 
employed to ease the application of norms of international law in particular cases.39
                                                 
37 Sassòli and Bouvier (note 
 The 
principle of proportionality is both a principle of IHL and international law in general and 
should also be considered as an element of interpretation as to how far a State’s obligations 
reach. 
18) 138-139. 
38 Dahl (note 32) at 49. Dahl writes that conversely captain Eck’s murder of all survivors on the freighter Pelus 
during the Second World War, so that they would not reveal that Eck’s submarine operated in the waters if they 
were rescued, was not accepted. Likewise, it can not be deemed as being military necessary that the wounded 
Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers at Kaprolat/Hasselmann were shot by the Soviet soldiers because it would be too 
much work entailed with bringing the wounded soldiers with them.   
39 Higgins (note 34) 219. The author herself, however, is sceptical to the principles use outside IHL. 
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2.3 State obligations 
Legal obligations are legal requirements with which subjects to the law are bound to 
conform.40 When determining what an obligation entails, a distinction is commonly drawn 
between obligations of conduct and obligations of result.41 The classification of a State 
obligation as either an obligation ‘of conduct’ or an obligation ‘of result’ must be made 
through interpretation of the obligation.42
 
 
An obligation of result provides that a State has to achieve a specific result, but does not 
provide the particular means the State has to employ to achieve it. Conversely, an obligation 
of conduct might also state a specific result, but the obligation will always as well provide for 
the specific steps (acts or omissions) the State has to undertake in order to reach this result. 
The description of conduct must be rather specific for the obligation to be an obligation of 
conduct.43
 
 
To determine whether an obligation of result has been breached, one has to compare the result 
actually achieved by the State with the result required by the obligation.44 Conversely, to 
determine whether an obligation of conduct has been breached, one has to compare the action 
or omission found to have occurred with the conduct specifically required of the organ 
responsible for said act or omission.45
                                                 
40 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy ‘Legal Obligation and Authority’. Available at: 
 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/  [Accessed 22 November 2010]. 
41 ILC (note 19) at p 56 para. 11. 
42 The International Law Commission (ILC) ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of 
its twenty-ninth session’ (1977) YILC, vol. II, Part Two, p 16 para. 17. 
43 Human Rights Resource Centre ‘Obligations of States and Nonstate Actors’. Available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/module9.htm [Accessed 22 November 2010]. 
44 ILC (note 42) at p 29 para 35. 
45 ILC (note 42) at p 16 para 18. 
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3. Which IHL obligations are posed on the respective States regarding the 
remains of the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers who died during combat 
actions in the Russian Karelia in 1944?  
3.1 The State obligations under international humanitarian law regarding post-
mortem handling of soldiers left in combat area 
3.1.1 The obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead and to prevent them from 
being despoiled 
The first Geneva Convention Article 15(1) states that ‘[a]t all times, and particularly after an 
engagement, Parties to the conflict shall without delay, take all possible measures…to search 
for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.’ According to Protocol I Article 33(4) ‘[t]he 
Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to agree on arrangements for teams to search for…and 
recover the dead from battlefield areas…’ 
 
On the background of these treaty rules as well as State practice and several national military 
manuals, the ICRC has identified Rule 112 which provides that ‘[w]henever circumstances 
permit, and particularly after an engagement, each party to the conflict must, without delay, 
take all possible measures to search for, collect and evacuate the dead without adverse 
distinction.’46
 
 According to the Study’s rule 113 ‘[e]ach party to the conflict must take all 
possible measures to prevent the dead from being despoiled.’ 
The question is which obligations can be deduced from these provisions. According to the 
ICRC, the obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead must be interpreted as an 
obligation of conduct.47
 
 The fact that both the treaty provisions and the customary rule 
describe actions, that are to be taken by the States, supports this view. However, as seen in 
chapter 2.3 the action or conduct has to be specific for the obligation to be an obligation of 
conduct. The fact that the obligation does not describe specific steps that have to be taken in 
order to search, collect and evacuate the dead and to prevent them from being despoiled, 
points in the direction of the obligation being an obligation of result.  
                                                 
46 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 406-408. 
47 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 407. 
 13 
Still, an obligation of result is breached where the result achieved by the State is not in 
conformity with the result required by the obligation. In this case the obligation does not call 
for a definite result, but rather that the parties to the conflict have to take ‘all possible 
measures’ to aim towards a result. This points decisively in the direction of the obligation 
being an obligation of conduct. 
 
Hence, the obligation is for the States to make sure their conduct is consistent with taking ‘all 
possible measures’ to search, collect and evacuate the dead and prevent them from being 
despoiled. This can also entail permitting humanitarian organisations, including the ICRC, to 
carry out the mission. What taking ‘all possible measures’ entails in this specific circumstance 
for the different parties to the conflict may depend on an interpretation of the obligation on 
the basis of the fundamental principles of international law and IHL (see chapter 2.2). 
 
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, the term ‘all possible measures’ cannot be 
interpreted as every possible measure no matter how costly or no matter how uncertain it is 
that it carries results. When determining what all possible measures entail, concern must thus 
be had to inter alia the costs, the certainty of positive outcome and amount of diplomatic 
difficulties the search and evacuation will cause for the State. This must be weighed against 
the concern to humanity. The interests of everyone being entitled to a dignified burial in a 
marked grave and the rights of the families to know the fate of their relatives are such 
concerns. 
3.1.2 Obligations with a view to the identification of the dead 
The I Geneva Convention Article 17 codifies obligations with a view to identifying the 
dead.48
 
 According to Article 17 the ‘Parties to the conflict shall ensure that burial…is 
preceded by a careful examination, if possible by a medical examination of the bodies, with a 
view to conforming death, establishing identity and enabling a report to be made…’ The 
phrase ‘shall ensure’, indicates an obligation. 
                                                 
48 Also Article 16 of the Convention establishes some obligations in this regard, but this is limited to the 
registration of available information such as particulars as shown on the dead soldier’s identity cards. 
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On the basis of the I Geneva Convention, numerous military manuals as well as resolutions 
adopted on the international level,49 the ICRC has identified customary rule 116. The rule 
establishes that ‘[w]ith a view to the identification of the dead, each party to the conflict must 
record all available information prior to disposal and mark the location of the graves.’50
 
 Also 
this rule is formulated as an obligation for the parties. 
The provisions establish the identification of the dead as the result of the obligation. This 
could suggest that we are dealing with an obligation of result. However, an obligation of 
conduct might have, in similarity to an obligation of result, a particular object of result. The 
difference is that for the obligation to be an obligation of conduct, the result has to be 
achieved through actions specifically determined in the obligation. Since the obligation 
describes which actions that are to be taken in order to identify the dead, the obligation is an 
obligation of conduct. 
  
The obligation is to record ‘…all available information…’ When it comes to the Norwegian 
SS soldiers, their remains have been lying in the open for so many years that DNA testing 
might be the only way to identify them. This is especially true since scavengers have taken 
objects that could have been of importance to the identification. The question is then whether 
an obligation to perform DNA testing can be interpreted into the obligation to record all 
available information. From a natural interpretation the DNA might not be deemed as 
‘available information’, since there has to be performed extensive testing to get the results. 
Hence, it might be argued that the obligation to perform DNA testing cannot be deduced from 
the obligation to record all available information. 
 
However, the ICRC study states the parties have to use their best efforts and all means at their 
disposal in order to identify the dead. According to the ICRC, practice suggests that 
exhumation combined with the application of forensic methods, including DNA testing, may 
be an appropriate method of identifying the dead after burial.51
                                                 
49 The resolution V of the 22nd International Conference of the Red Cross (1973), General Assembly Resolution 
3220 (XXIX) (1974) and the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (1999). 
 The reason why DNA testing 
is an appropriate method of identifying the dead after burial is presumably because this might 
be the only possible way to identify decomposed remains. DNA testing should thus be an 
appropriate method of identifying the dead also in our case.  
50 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 417 cf. p 379 and p 417-419. 
51 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 420. 
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The commentary to Article 17 states that in the absence of papers that can establish the 
identity of the dead soldier ‘recourse must be had to other methods which will make it 
possible for the adverse Party itself to establish his identity, e.g. measurements and 
description of the body and its physical features, examination of the teeth, fingerprints, 
photograph, etc.’52
 
 These examples seem to include most of the methods available in order to 
identify a body in 1949. This suggests that today when DNA testing is a possibility, this 
method must be applied. However, since DNA testing is a fairly expensive measure, concern 
must be had to the principle of proportionality also in this regard. 
According to ICRC’s study on customary IHL, the obligations with a view to identifying the 
dead are reinforced by the requirement of respect for family life and the right of families to 
know the fate of their relatives. Both these principles have customary status as well as being 
codified in several multinational treaties.53
3.1.3 The obligation to dispose of the dead in a respectful manner 
 Thus concern should also be had to these 
requirements when applying the obligations. 
The obligation to dispose of combatants who die in the field in a respectful manner is codified 
in the I Geneva Convention Article 17. The Article specifies that the dead must be buried, if 
possible, according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged and that they may only 
be cremated in exceptional circumstances. The Article furthermore provides that burial should 
be in individual graves grouped according to nationality if possible.54
 
 
Article 17’s opening phrase is ‘Parties to the conflict shall ensure…’ The wording indicates 
an obligation. Accordingly, the commentary to the I Geneva Convention states that the Parties 
to the conflict have to make certain that this prescribed task, for which they are responsible, is 
duly carried out and there is no justification for thinking that the task is optional.55
 
 
On the basis of Article 17 as well as many military manuals and legislation in most, if not all, 
States the ICRC study on customary IHL has identified customary rule 115. The rule 
                                                 
52 Jean Pictet Commentary on the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1952) 177. 
53 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 417 cf. p 379 and p 421. 
54 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 416. 
55 Pictet (note 52) at 176-177. 
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establishes that ‘[t]he dead must be disposed of in a respectful manner and their graves 
respected and properly maintained.’56
 
 The fact that the dead ‘must’ be disposed of in a 
respectful manner indicates that also the customary rule sets forward an obligation for the 
States. 
The question is then whether the obligation to dispose of the dead in a respectful manner is an 
obligation of conduct or an obligation of result. Article 17 describes specific steps that the 
parties have to undertake in order to dispose of the dead in a respectful manner and is thus an 
obligation of conduct. This entails that the States that are subject to the obligation have to act 
in conformity with the conduct described to fulfil the obligation. 
 
The conduct is described as something the parties ‘shall ensure’ or ‘must’ do. This indicates 
an absolute obligation. The further requirements to the burial in Article 17, on the other hand, 
are delimitated to what is possible. However, no State can be obliged to achieve something 
that the State is not in a position to achieve.57
 
 Also the primary obligation to dispose of the 
dead in a respectful manner must consequently be delimitated to what is possible. 
As seen under chapter 3.1.1 the principle of proportionality can lead to a narrow interpretation 
of the term ‘all possible measures’ when it comes to the obligation to search, collect and 
evacuate the dead. This will indirectly have effect on the interpretation of the present 
obligation since the obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead is a conditio sine qua 
non for respectful burial.58
 
 It is however difficult to imagine a situation where the principle of 
proportionality could lead to further limitations on the obligation to give the dead a respectful 
burial where the dead are collected in accordance with the obligation in chapter 3.1.1. 
Article 34(1) of the I Protocol states, in a very generally manner, that the remains of certain 
persons ‘shall be respected’. According to the commentary to the Protocol this provision for 
one part entails, in similarity to Article 17 of the I Geneva Convention, that the remains are to 
be disposed of as far as possible in accordance with wishes or the religious beliefs of the 
                                                 
56 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 414. 
57 Human Rights Resource Centre (note 43). 
58 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 407. 
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deceased. However, according to the commentary the provision also entails that the parties 
have to place the remains in an appropriate place before burial or cremation.59
3.1.4 The obligation to endeavour to facilitate the return of the remains and to return 
the personal effects of the deceased 
 
The I Geneva Convention Article 17(2) states that the Parties to the conflict shall ‘…organize 
at the commencement of hostilities an Official Graves Registration Service, to allow…the 
possible transportation to the home country.’  
 
The reference to the possible return of the remains was introduced by the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1949. The clause was left optional to satisfy both the countries that as a custom 
bring the dead home at the close of hostilities and the countries that prefer to have them 
buried in the actual location where they have fallen.60
 
 As a consequence the provision is 
rather general and requires agreement between the parties for the remains to be returned. It 
cannot be deduced any obligation to return the remains from this provision, but it obligates 
the parties to arrange for the possibility.  
The I Protocol Article 34(2) c provides that ‘[a]s soon as circumstances and the relations 
between the adverse Parties permit, the High Contracting Parties in whose territories graves 
and, as the case may be, other locations of the remains of persons who have died as a result of 
hostilities…shall conclude agreements in order…to facilitate the return of the remains of the 
deceased…to the home country upon its request or, unless that country objects, upon the 
request of the next of kin.’ 
 
The fact that the parties ‘shall’ conclude agreements to facilitate the return of the remains 
implies a legal obligation. The obligation is to conclude agreements. Consequently, the 
obligation is for the State to undertake a specific act which entails that the obligation is an 
obligation of conduct. 
 
The fact that the obligation, in addition to being conditioned on a request, is conditioned on 
the circumstances and the relations between the adverse parties demonstrates that the parties 
                                                 
59 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann Commentary on the Additional Protocols (1987) 
367 para. 1307. 
60 Pictet (note 52) at 181. 
 18 
are not expected to do more than what can be reasonably expected in order to conclude the 
agreements.  
 
Based on the I Geneva Convention Article 17(2), the I Protocol Article 34(2), three 
international resolutions that calls upon parties to armed conflicts to facilitate the return of the 
dead61 as well as State practice and military manuals, the ICRC identified customary rule 114. 
The rule states that the ‘[p]arties to the conflict must endeavour to facilitate the return of the 
remains of the deceased upon the request of their next of kin.’62
 
 
The obligation does not specifically describe which steps the State has to undertake in order to 
facilitate the return of the remains. However, seeing that the obligation does not describe a 
definite result, but rather an objective the States should endeavour to reach, the obligation has 
to be construed as an obligation of conduct. 
 
The fact that the parties must ‘endeavour’ to facilitate the return of the remains does not mean 
that the parties have to take all available measures in this regard. Still, the parties have to 
make an effort to make this happen. Where a State has not made such effort its conduct is 
inconsistent with the obligation. 
 
A natural understanding of the phrase ‘facilitate’ is to assist the progress of something. In the 
commentary to Article 34 it is written that the fact that the agreements concluded in 
accordance with the Article must ‘facilitate’ the return of the remains implies the exhumation 
of the remains, when they have been buried, and the forwarding of such remains.63
 
 In 
accordance with the natural understanding of the word ‘facilitate’, I assume that it is adequate 
for the obligated State to assist the progress of such exhumation and forwarding of remains. 
The customary rule also uses the term ‘facilitate’. It is presumed that the term has the same 
meaning in both legal bases.  
The Protocol Article 32 states as a general principle that in the implementation of the 
Protocol’s section on the missing and dead ‘…the activities of the…Parties to the 
conflict…shall be prompted mainly by the right of families to know the fate of their relatives. 
                                                 
61 See note 49. 
62 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 411. 
63 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (note 59) at 373 para. 1334. 
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The customary rule also builds on this principle. Thus, a possible return of the remains would 
be to Norway as country of citizenship and where the soldier’s next of kin are situated, as 
opposed to Germany that was the State in whose force the soldiers were serving. 
 
The obligation in the customary rule 114 is conditioned on a request from the next of kin. 
Logically the next of kin will often first be capable of putting forward such request after the 
obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead has been fulfilled. Since the I Geneva 
Convention Article 17(2) obligates the parties to provide for the possible return of the remains 
of the deceased, a breach of the obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead can 
possibly be seen as a breach of this obligation as well. 
 
As regards the return of personal effects, Article 16(3) of the I Geneva Convention states that 
the parties shall collect and forward to each other ‘…last wills or other documents of 
importance to the next of kin, money and in general all articles of an intrinsic or sentimental 
value, which are found on the dead.’ The obligation is to forward the personal effects to ‘each 
other’ which would entail that the State on whose territory the effects are found forwards the 
effects to the home State of the deceased. However, the obligation is clearly motivated by the 
concern to the next of kin and it is this concern which determines which types of objects that 
should be returned.  
 
According to the customary rule 114 the ‘[p]arties to the conflict…must return [the 
deceased’s] personal effects to [their next of kin].’ State practice and opinio juris have 
evidently gone in the direction of an obligation for all parties to the conflict to ensure the 
return of the objects directly to the deceased next of kin as opposed to home State. The 
objects expressly provided for in Article 16(3) must be presumed as also constituting 
‘personal effects’ under the customary rule. 
 
The obligation to return the personal effects is formulated as a strict obligation, but without 
describing the specific steps the State should undertake to come to the result. This obligation 
is consequently an obligation of result. Where the conduct of a State has not lead to the result 
of the personal effects being returned to the deceased’s next of kin, the State has not acted in 
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accordance with the obligation.64
3.2 The obligations’ scope of application  
 However, also this obligation has to be delimitated to what 
is possible and proportionate. 
3.2.1 Do the obligations apply to the remains of the Norwegian soldiers in German war 
service? 
According to Article 13 of the I Geneva Convention, the Convention applies inter alia to 
‘[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or 
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces’. The I Protocol has a wide scope of 
application and applies to all those affected by an armed conflict.65
 
 Volunteer soldiers in 
German forces thus fall within the treaties’ scope of application. 
International humanitarian law is designed to protect those who are not or no longer, taking 
part in the hostilities, such as the wounded, the sick, prisoners and civilians.66 The reasoning 
behind the rules of protection in IHL is that an attack on the protected persons gives a little or 
non existent military advantage.67
 
 Dead combatants are obviously of no threat to the opposing 
party and, as we have seen, their remains are thus protected by several treaty provisions as 
well as customary rules of international humanitarian law.  
After having established that the remains of dead volunteer soldiers principally are to be 
protected, the question is whether this includes the remains of the Norwegian Waffen SS 
soldiers who died in the Karelia region. As seen, the situation is particular since it involves 
Norwegian soldiers,68
 
 in German service, whose remains are left on Soviet/Russian territory. 
The question is whether there are any limitations to the principle of protection which could 
entail that the IHL does not apply to these specific soldiers. 
                                                 
64 The I Protocol Article 34(2) c, on the contrary is formulated as an obligation to ‘facilitate’ the return of the 
personal effects upon request from either the home State of the deceased or his next of kin. The commentary to 
the Protocol states that Article 34 cannot diminish the obligations arising from the Conventions cf. Sandoz, 
Swinarski and Zimmermann (note 59) at 373 para. 1331. 
65 Cf. Article 9 cf. Article 1 cf. the Geneva Conventions common Article 2. 
66 Marco Sassòli and Antoine A. Bouvier How does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching 
Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law: Volume II: Cases and Documents 2ed 
(2006) 2115. 
67 Dahl (note 32) at 132. 
68 Categorized as traitors cf. the Norwegian Criminal Act section 86. 
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Frits Kalshovden states that ‘[t]he system of protection of the Geneva Conventions rests on 
the fundamental principle that protected persons must be respected and protected in all 
circumstance, and must be treated humanely without any adverse distinction founded on sex, 
race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or any other similar criteria.’69 When it comes to 
warfare on land, this principle is codified in the first Geneva Convention Article 12. In the 
commentary to the I Geneva Convention it is accordingly stated that ‘[t]he wounded are to be 
respected just as much when they are with their own army or in no man’s land as when they 
have fallen into the hands of the enemy. The obligation applies to all combatants in an army, 
whoever they may be…’70 In the ICRC Study the principle of no adverse distinction is 
identified as a rule of customary IHL.71
 
 
In other words, the fact that the soldiers who fought in Karelia were Norwegian nationals in 
German service, or the fact that they were considered as traitors under Norwegian law, does 
not make any difference when it comes to which protection their remains are to receive under 
IHL. Hence, the obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the dead are 
applicable to the remains of the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers. 
3.2.2 Do the obligations apply post-conflict? 
The Geneva Conventions’ common Article 2 establishes the material scope of application of 
the conventions to ‘…all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them.’ It will here be assumed without further discussion that the 
Second World War fulfils these requirements. Thus, the preliminary provision for the 
application of IHL is present and the situation falls within the international humanitarian 
law’s material scope of application. However, as the Second World War ended in 1945 the 
question is whether the IHL continues to apply post-conflict. 
 
According to the I Protocol Article 3, the Protocol and the Geneva Conventions shall apply 
from the beginning of a declared war or any other armed conflict. The application ends ‘…in 
the territory of Parties to the conflict, on the general close of military operations…except…for 
                                                 
69 Frits Kalshovden (note 26) at 53. 
70 Pictet (note 52) at 134. 
71 Codified as rule 88 cf. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 308. The principle is also set forth in the I, 
II and IV Geneva Conventions (Articles 13, 16 and 27). 
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those persons whose final release, repatriation or re-establishment takes place thereafter. 
These persons shall continue to benefit from the relevant provisions of the Conventions and of 
this Protocol until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment.’ 
 
The treaties’ temporal scope of application regarding the dead combatants thus end either ‘on 
the general close of military operations’ or at their ‘final…repatriation.’ The natural 
understanding of the word ‘repatriation’ is that persons are returned to their own country. 
Repatriation of the dead would thus have to entail returning the remains of the deceased to 
their home State. An argument for employing the general close of military operations as the 
decisive moment is that there does not necessarily have to be a ‘final…repatriation’ in the 
case of deceased. Often, dead combatants are buried in the State where they die, regardless of 
this being their home State or not. 
 
Against this argument counts the fact that both the obligation to endeavour to facilitate the 
return of the remains of the deceased and the obligations with a view to the identification of 
the dead in some cases call for the exhumation of remains. The IHL regarding the dead is thus 
applicable also after burial. Consequently, final repatriation could be the appropriate decisive 
moment for the end of application of international humanitarian law, even if combatants often 
are buried in the State where they die. 
 
According to Article 15(1) of the I Geneva Convention and customary rule 112, the obligation 
to search, collect and evacuate the dead is to be fulfilled ‘particularly after each engagement’. 
The wording could seem to indicate that the obligation is meant to be carried out in close 
connection to the combat actions and that the application thus ends ‘on the general close of 
military operations’. In accordance with this interpretation the commentary to the I Geneva 
Convention states that ‘Article 15 applies exclusively to operations at the front.’72
 
 This 
implies that the Article only is applicable during continuing hostilities. The question is 
whether this excludes the obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead from being 
employed post-conflict. 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Final rapport on the Missing, the 
I Geneva Convention Article 15 deals with the serious issue of ‘…the management of human 
                                                 
72 Pictet (note 5252) at 150. 
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remains post-conflict…’73
 
 The obligation ‘…to search for the dead and prevent their being 
despoiled…’ was here applied with regard to the two-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
two years after the war ended. This implies that at least the ICRC deems the obligation to be 
applicable post-conflict. 
The questions relating to the remains of the deceased pose problems ‘well after the end of an 
armed conflict.’74 The international humanitarian law would therefore not give satisfying 
protection to this group of people if its application was to end on the general close of military 
operations. This could entail that the obligations must be interpreted as being applicable until 
final repatriation of the remains. The fact that fulfilment of all the other obligations regarding 
the dead is conditioned on a preceding fulfilment of the obligation to search, collect and 
evacuate the dead, entails that this obligation in particular should be interpreted widely.75 
Seeing that the commentary to Article 3 of the I Protocol mentions the provisions relating to 
the dead as examples on articles whose application may continue beyond termination of the 
conflict, 76 the conclusion must be that the I Protocol and the Geneva Conventions are 
applicable to the dead ‘until their final…repatriation…’77
 
 
The I Geneva Convention itself contains a provision providing that the final repatriation of the 
protected persons is the decisive moment for the end of its application.78 Seeing that the 
Nicaragua case establishes that the Convention is a mere crystallization of customary 
international law, it is presumed that the same point of time is decisive for the application of 
customary IHL.79
3.2.3 Are Russia, Germany and Norway bound by the obligations? 
 Thus, the IHL obligations regarding the dead apply post-conflict. 
The I Geneva Convention and the I Protocol have been ratified by Russia, Germany and 
Norway. Hence, the three States are directly bound by obligations set forth by these treaties. 
Furthermore, all States are bound by obligations deriving from customary law. The question is 
                                                 
73 Gill Kitley ’Strategies for raising concern on the war dead with governments, the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations: Some experiences from United Nations peacekeeping operations.’ ICRC’s final 
rapport on The Missing: Action to resolve the problem of people unaccounted for as a result of armed conflict or 
internal violence and to assist their families, p 80. 
74 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (note 59) at 341 para. 1193. 
75 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (note 11) at 407. 
76 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (note 59) at 66 para. 149. 
77 Cf. I Protocol Article 3. 
78 I Geneva Convention Article 5. 
79 Nicaragua case p 103 para. 208. 
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whether the three States specifically are bound by obligations regarding the Norwegian SS 
soldiers in the particular setting. 
 
According to Article 1 of the I Geneva Convention ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake 
to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’. The fact that 
the parties have to ‘respect’ the convention entails that the parties have to act in accordance 
with obligations addressed to them.80
 
 To find out whether Russia, Germany and Norway are 
bound by the obligations regarding the dead with concern to the Norwegian soldiers we thus 
have to find out which States the obligations are addressed to.  
Most of the obligations regarding the dead are addressed to ‘the parties to the conflict’.81 The 
question is which States the parties to the conflict, in which the Norwegian Waffen SS 
soldiers died, are. The parties to a conflict are defined as the opposing sides in an armed 
conflict.82
 
 The identification of the opposing sides in this conflict depends on whether we see 
the battle over Finland or the entire World War II as the ‘conflict’ referred to.  
In its Tadic judgement the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
presented a definition of ‘armed conflict’ which later has been generally accepted. According 
to the court an ‘armed conflict’ is ‘…resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.’83
 
 This definition does not help us determine what conflict is referred to 
in our case.  
However the ICTY elaborates the definition with regard to the application of IHL by stating 
that ‘…international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring 
States…whether or not actual combat takes place there.’84
                                                 
80 The fact that the Contracting Parties also undertake to ‘ensure respect’ for the Convention entails that ‘…in the 
event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and 
should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Contevntion.’ Cf. Pictet (note 
 All the parties to the Second World 
52) at 26. 
81 To be accurate The Protocol Article 34(2) which provides for the obligation to conclude agreements in order to 
facilitate the return of the remains of the deceased and of personal effects to the home country is only addressed 
to the High Contracting Parties in whose territories the remains are situated. In this case that would be Russia. 
However, the obligation to endeavour to facilitate the return of the remains and personal effects embodied in the 
customary law does not have the same restrictions and is thus addressed to all the parties to the conflict. 
82 ICRC ‘Banning Anti-Personnel Mines – The Ottawa Treaty Explained’ (1998) Annex I.. Available at: 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/PANA-7DQHZP?OpenDocument [Accessed 23 November 2010]. 
83 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic para. 70. 
84 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic para. 70. 
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War must be deemed as warring States at the time. This indicates that World War II was the 
conflict and not the battle over Finland.85
 
 Moreover, the fact that IHL continues to apply in 
the whole territory of the warring State whether or not actual combat actions takes place there, 
suggests that the fact that the specific combat actions took place in Finland is not decisive for 
the assessment of the area of conflict. 
On the other hand, it might seem unreasonable for all States, parties to the Second World 
War, to be obligated with concern to all the persons who died at all different battlefields 
during the war. The question is thus whether the obligations’ personal scope of application 
have to be given a narrower interpretation. 
 
It would be logical if the obligations regarding the dead were addressed to the State in which 
territory the remains were situated, seeing that this State will have jurisdiction over the 
remains. The predecessor to the I Geneva Convention of 1949, the 1929 Geneva Convention 
Article 3 addressed the obligation to search for the dead to ‘…the occupant of the field of 
battle…’ The commentary to the I Geneva Convention states that the readdressing from ‘the 
occupant of the field of battle’ in the 1929 Convention to ‘the Parties to the conflict’ in the 
1949 Convention was meant to make the obligations of the belligerents more 
comprehensive.86
 
 This entails that it is not just the State that have territorial jurisdiction over 
the remains which have obligations regarding them. Also the fact that many of the obligations 
concerning the dead now require agreements and cooperation between the States makes it 
apparent that the obligations bind more than one State. 
As regards the possibility of unreasonable results, this can be remedied by using the principles 
of international law and IHL as an element of interpretation as to how far the States’ 
obligations reach. For instance, applying the principle of proportionality, a State with 
moderate connection to a specific combat action might be assigned less far reaching 
obligations than the State in whose territory the incident took place. Where there is very 
limited connection between a State and the dead combatants, the State can probably not be 
expected to take more comprehensive measures than what could have been expected of a third 
party, regardless of connection to the conflict, in terms of the obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for 
                                                 
85 See note 2. 
86 Pictet (note 52) at 151. 
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the international humanitarian law.87
 
 Hence, all the parties to the Second World War are 
‘parties to the conflict’ and should thus be subjects to IHL obligations regarding the dead 
Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers. 
On the other hand, Statements in the Diplomatic Committee makes the application of 
obligations contained in the I Protocol’s section on the missing and dead vis-à-vis a States’ 
own nationals questionable.88 This could suggest that Norway is not subject to the obligations 
regarding the dead Norwegian soldiers. However, no such exception is made in the I Geneva 
Convention which as a result also should apply in the relationship between Norway and 
Norwegian soldiers.89
 
 Moreover, the ICRC does not seem to have detected such delimitation 
in the scope of application in their study on customary IHL. Consequently, at least as long as 
the obligations do not exclusively derive from the Protocol, they are also applicable in the 
relationship between Norway and the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers.  
The question is then whether anything in the particular tripartite relationship makes any 
difference as to the obligations imposed on the three States. The commentary to the I Geneva 
Convention states that the obligation to respect the Convention is ‘…not an engagement 
concluded on a basis of reciprocity, binding each party to the contract only in so far as the 
other party observes its obligations. It is rather a series of unilateral engagements solemnly 
contracted before the world as represented by the other Contracting Parties.’90
 
 The fact that 
the other States are not fulfilling their obligations does thus not interfere with the obligations 
of the first State. Conversely, the fact that other States are obligated or have assumed 
responsibility for certain actions does not interfere with the obligations of the first State, 
assuming that actions by the second State have not caused the obligation to cease to exist by 
its fulfilment. 
To conclude, Russia, Germany and Norway are all bound by the obligations regarding the 
dead Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers. 
                                                 
87 See note 80. 
88 O.R. XIII p. 361, CDDH/II/406/Rev.1, para. 32. This might be due to the traditional concept of international 
law claiming that a person can only be a legal subject within a State. 
89 The opposite is true for the IV Geneva Convention. See Oscar Uhler and Henri Coursier Commentary on the 
IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the time of war (1958) 372.  
90 Pictet (note 52) at 25. 
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3.2.4 Can the obligations as they are construed today be applied with regard to the 
remains of soldiers who died in 1944? 
3.2.4.1 The principle of no retroaction 
We have until this point established the IHL obligations regarding the dead as they are to be 
construed on the basis of the sources applicable today. However, it is by no means obvious 
that these sources are applicable when it comes to obligations regarding the remains of 
soldiers who died in 1944. International humanitarian law is a dynamic instrument. Treaties 
concluded at different points in time develop the law. The same do State actions and the work 
of international organizations. As a result, what is construed as being applicable IHL at one 
point in time is not necessarily the same as what is applicable IHL 10 or 60 years later. This 
brings about the question of whether an IHL provision can apply to circumstances that 
happened prior to the provision came into force. 
 
When a rule of law is applied to a situation which occurred prior to the rule came into force, 
the rule is given retroactive effect. Frede Castberg writes that it is a general principal in every 
civilized community that new legal rules is not given retroactive effect and that this is also a 
principle of international law. 91
 
 
In national Norwegian law the Constitution prohibits the Norwegian parliament from giving 
laws retroactive effect. The States, as lawmakers on the international level, are not restrained 
by a similar prohibition. This entails that where a provision in a treaty explicitly provides for 
its own retroactive effect, this will be a valid international provision. It is where the treaty 
provision is silent on the matter of retroactivity the principle of no retroaction comes into 
action.92
                                                 
91 Frede Castberg Folkerett 2ed (1948) 21-22. 
 This principle is now codified in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties which states that ‘[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or 
any situation which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect 
to that party.’  Thus, as a main rule the obligations regarding the dead based on the I Geneva 
Convention from 1949, the I Protocol from 1977 and customary IHL developed after the 
Second World War, cannot be applied with regard to any act or fact which took place in 1944. 
92 Castberg (note 91) at 21-22. 
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The question is whether an exception has to be made because a different intention is 
established. 
3.2.4.2 Applicability of obligations that explicitly address historical events 
Where the obligations in a treaty explicitly address historical events, an intention to apply the 
obligations to acts or facts which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the 
date of entry into force of the treaty is established. In accordance with the Vienna Convention 
Article 28, obligations under IHL may thus be applied to circumstances which happened prior 
to the provision came into force where the obligations explicitly address historical events. The 
I Geneva Convention was drafted during the aftermath of the Second World War. It could be 
argued that the drafters must have had the soldiers, who lied unburied at different locations as 
a consequence of the war, in mind when they drafted the provisions concerning the dead and 
that the obligations thus address historical event.  
 
However, the application of the provisions with regard to the soldiers who died during the 
Second World War is not mentioned in the Convention or its commentaries. This could be 
seen in relation to the fact that the Chapter in the Convention containing the provisions on the 
dead was not on the whole assessed to entail any radical change from the corresponding 
provision in the I Geneva Conventions predecessor, the 1929 Geneva Convention. According 
to the commentaries to the I Geneva Convention, the changes and additions that had been 
made was on matter of details and the majority of the new provisions could be regarded as 
implicit in the earlier texts. 93
 
 This could however indicate that the same rule of law that is 
interpreted from the I Geneva Convention is applicable to earlier events even if the provisions 
do not explicitly address historical events. 
Yet, when it comes to the I Protocol, although some of the provisions relating to the dead are 
mere clarifications of existing obligations, some provisions also entails an extension of the 
existing obligations.94 Since my interpretation of the current obligations regarding the dead 
also is based on the provisions in the I Protocol,95
 
 this entails that the obligations only are 
applicable if the provisions in the Protocol explicitly addresses historical events. 
                                                 
93 Pictet (note 5252) 132-133. 
94 Official records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law (Geneva 1974-1977) O.R. XI, p 186, CDDH/II/SR.19. 
95 And customary law which is partly based on the Protocol. 
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In the Commentary to the section on the missing and dead in the I Protocol it is stated that 
‘[o]bviously we would not wish to defend the idea of retroactive application of the Protocol, 
but even so it is to be hoped that Parties bound by it will refer to it to resolve problems still 
unresolved at the end of a conflict which had ended before they had become bound by the 
Protocol.’96
3.2.4.3 Applicability of obligations entered into during a continuing wrongful act 
 Hence, the extended obligations in the I Protocol do not address historical events. 
Thus, the obligations as they are construed today are not applicable with regards to the 
remains of the soldiers who died in 1944 on the basis of the obligations explicitly addressing 
historical events. 
Because a different intention does not appear from the treaties or is otherwise established, the 
provisions do not bind the Parties in relation to any act or fact which took place or any 
situation which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaties. The same is 
the case for the customary obligations that have developed after the war.  
 
However, what is stated in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention is that the ‘provisions do not 
bind a party in relation to…any situation which ceased to exist before the date of entry into 
force of the treaty with respect to that party (my emphasis).’ The question is whether a breach 
of an international obligation that has a continuing character renders the obligations entered 
into before the breach ceases applicable to the situation. 
 
In its Lovelace v. Canada case the Human Rights Committee found that an act may constitute 
a breach of an international obligation, even if the act is committed before the obligation is 
entered into. The condition is that the act has a continuing character which extends past the 
point in time when the obligation comes into force. The continuing act will then constitute a 
breach of the obligation after this date. 
 
In the case the Committee held that it had jurisdiction to examine the continuing effects for 
the applicant of the loss of her status as a registered member of an Indian group, although the 
loss had occurred at the time of her marriage in 1970 and Canada accepted the committee’s 
jurisdiction in 1976. The committee also found that the continuing impact of the Canadian 
                                                 
96 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (note 59) p 341 para. 1193. 
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legislation constituted a breach of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which also was entered into in 1976.97
 
 
Also the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction is limited to events occurring after the 
respondent State became a party to the Convention or the relevant Protocol and accepted the 
right of individual petition. The Court has as a result applied the principle of continuing 
wrongful acts to establish its jurisdiction ratione temporis in a series of cases.98
 
 
The Papamichalopoulos case concerned the question of whether a seizure of property was in 
breach of the right to peaceful enjoyment of property under Article 1 of the Protocol to the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Greece argued that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction since the alleged unlawful seizure of property occurred eight years before Greece 
recognized the Court’s competence. The Court rejected the argument and held that there was a 
continuing breach of the right to peaceful enjoyment of property under Article 1, which 
continued after the Protocol had come into force. The Court accordingly upheld its 
jurisdiction over the claim.99
 
 
Similar reasoning was applied by the Court in the Loizidou case. Here the continuing 
wrongful act was the applicants denied access to her property in northern Cyprus as a result of 
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.100
 
 
Consequently, if Russia, Germany and Norway’s omission to take action regarding the dead 
Norwegian SS soldiers constitutes a continuing wrongful act, also IHL obligations entered 
into after 1944, but before the wrongful act ceased to exist, are applicable. 
 
The question is whether the respective States’ passivity until at least the year 2007 constituted 
a continuing wrongful act. Article 2 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Draft 
Articles) provides that ‘[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct 
                                                 
97 Lovelace v. Canada CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 para. 10-11 cited in ILC (note 19) at p 61 para. 11. 
98 ILC (note 19) at 60 para. 9. 
99 Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece para. 40 (1993) cited in ILC (note 19) 60 para. 9. 
100 Loizidou v. Turkey p. 2235–2236, para. 56 cited in ILC (note 19) 61 para. 10. 
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consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.’101
 
 
When the soldiers died in 1944 the 1929 Geneva Convention was the central convention 
establishing obligations regarding dead combatants. The 1929 Geneva Convention Article 3 
establishes obligations for the occupant of the field regarding the search for and protection of 
the dead. Article 4 of the 1929 Geneva Convention provided obligations for all the 
belligerents concerning e.g. burial and identification. In addition also provisions in different 
peace treaties prior to the Second World War provided for the burial and possible return of the 
war dead, indicating customary obligations regarding the dead on the basis of State 
practice.102
 
 Thus certain actions were required from the Parties. This indicates that passivity 
from the States constituted a breach of these obligations. 
However, as we have seen in chapter 2.2, obligations under international humanitarian law 
cannot today be construed as being absolute. Since development has gone in direction of more 
comprehensive State obligations, the case was probably even more so 60 years ago. This 
entails that the relationship between the States as well as the political situation in the States 
might have precluded wrongfulness in the remaining year of the war and the following years 
after the war came to an end.  
 
Nevertheless, in the Lovelace v. Canada case there was no breach of any international 
obligations at the time when Lovelace lost her Indian privileges. It was here adequate to 
establish a ‘continuing wrongful act’ that the continuing act became wrongful after the new 
obligation came into force.  
 
The States have omitted to act in accordance with IHL obligations regarding the dead. The 
fact that this omission cannot be construed as a wrongful act before the circumstances 
permitted the States to act, does not preclude the assessment of a continuing wrongful act 
from the moment the circumstances permitted the States to act in accordance with their 
                                                 
101 The Articles were adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001. General Assembly took note of the 
Articles by consensus, Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, the text of which was annexed to the resolution, 
and ‘commend[ed] to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or 
other appropriate action’. Since then international tribunals have more and more become accustom to treating the 
Draft Articles as a source on the question of State responsibility. Moreover, amongst others the principles of 
continuing wrongful act has been taken to reflect customary international law. Cf. James Crawford and Simon 
Olleson ‘Continuing Debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility’ (2005) 54 ICQL pp 959-968. 
102 Article 225 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
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obligations. Thus, the question is whether the States’ omission to act with regard to the dead 
soldiers had a continuing character. 
 
Article 14(2) of the Draft Articles states that ‘[t]he breach of an international obligation by an 
act of a State having a continuing character extends over the entire period during which the 
act continues and remains not in conformity with the international obligation.’ In the Rainbow 
Warrior arbitration the arbitral tribunal referred with approval to the Draft Articles and the 
distinction between instantaneous and continuing wrongful acts. The case demonstrates how 
an act of omission can constitute a continuing wrongful act. According to an agreement 
between France and New Zealand, France was obligated to detain two agents on the French 
Pacific island of Hao. France failed to comply with the requirements of the agreement for a 
period of three years. The arbitral tribunal stated that applying the distinction between 
instantaneous and continuing wrongful acts on the present case ‘…it is clear that the breach 
consisting in the failure of returning to Hao the two agents has been not only a material but 
also a continuous breach.’103
 
  
The arbitral tribunal further stated that ‘According to Article 25 [now Article 14], “the time of 
commission of the breach” extends over the entire period during which the unlawful act 
continues to take place. France committed a continuous breach of its obligations, without any 
interruption or suspension, during the whole period when the two agents remained in Paris in 
breach of the Agreement.’104
 
 This implies that the States are responsible for a continuing 
wrongful act for as long as they have remained in unconformity with their obligations to act. 
Russia, Germany and Norway have had an obligation to act ever since the soldiers died in 
1944. As long as the circumstances have permitted the States to act in accordance with these 
obligations, the States’ passivity has not been in conformity with this obligation. The States 
are consequently by omission responsible for a continuing wrongful act. All obligations the 
respective States have entered into during the period of this continuing omission are thus 
applicable. Hence, the IHL obligations regarding the dead as they are to be construed on the 
basis of the sources applicable today are applicable to the remains of the Norwegian Waffen 
SS soldiers who died in 1944. 
 
                                                 
103 Rainbow Warrior at p. 264, para. 101 cited in ILC (note 19) p 60 para. 8. 
104 Rainbow Warrior at p. 265-266 para. 105. 
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To conclude, Russia, Germany and Norway are obligated to take all possible measures in 
order to search, collect and evacuate the remains of the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers and 
prevent them from being despoiled. The respective States are also obligated to record all 
available information in order to identify the remains of the soldiers and ensure that the 
soldiers are respectfully disposed of. Lastly the States are obligated to endeavour to facilitate 
the return of the remains of the soldiers to Norway on the request from next of kin. 
3.3 Enforcement of the obligations 
According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility Article 30(a), a State which is 
responsible for a continuing wrongful act is under an obligation to cease the act.105
 
 In our case 
this entails that the States have to cease the continuing omission and act in accordance with 
the obligations regarding the dead. 
If the States refuse to fulfil their obligations the question of enforcement arises. As we have 
seen, the main consideration behind the specific rules concerning the dead is ‘the right of the 
families to know the fate of their relatives.’106 However, the commentary to the I Protocol 
states that ‘although there may be a right…it cannot be denied that there is no individual legal 
right for a representative of a family to insist that a government…concerned undertake[s] any 
particular action.’107
 
 
It is thus the parties to the conflict and the other States parties to the Protocol who have to 
ensure the application of the obligations.108 In a case of noncompliance the ICJ is the primary 
international tribunal to which States can submit legal disputes under international law.109 
However, a legal claim under international law has to be put forward by a State with legal 
interest to the claim. A State will have legal interest ‘when [its] nationals…receive injury or 
loss at the hands of another state.’110
 
 Where the injured parties are Norwegian nationals, 
Norway will probably be the only State with legal interest. This entails that there is no 
possible plaintiff with legal interest if Norway is the respondent to the claim. 
                                                 
105 The word ‘act’ covers both acts and omissions cf. Article 2. 
106 Cf. Article 33(1) of Protocol I. 
107 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (note 59) at 346 para. 1212. 
108 Sandoz, Swubarski and Zimmermann (note 59) at 246 para 1213. 
109 See note 20. 
110 Brownlie (note 21) at 477-478. 
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Hence, the fact that we have identified the presence of specific obligations for the States 
regarding the dead Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers does not necessarily entail that these 
obligations can be enforced if the States themselves refuse to comply. 
4. Have the States by recent activities been acting in accordance with their 
international humanitarian law obligations regarding the dead? 
4.1 Clarification of what actions are required in the Kaprolat/Hasselmann area 
Article 12 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility states that ’[t]here is a breach of an 
international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.’ Since most of the 
obligations regarding the dead are obligations of conduct that require certain actions to be 
taken, it is clear that passivity from the States is not in conformity with these obligations. 
Moreover several of the obligations require the cooperation between the States. Where this is 
the case, also the refusal to cooperate must be interpreted as not being in conformity with 
what is required by the obligation. It must also be clear that obstructing measures aimed 
against other States or entities’ attempt of reaching the obligations’ required result, will entail 
a breach of the obligations regarding the dead and the obligation to ‘respect and ensure 
respect’ for the international humanitarian law.111
 
 
The question is then what more specifically the States have to do in order to act in conformity 
with their obligations regarding the remains of the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers left in the 
Kaprolat/Hasselmann area. Firstly the States have the possibility of fulfilling their obligations 
through physical measures. The States can through State organs or agencies physically search, 
collect and evacuate the remains, guard the area against scavengers, record all available 
information with the view to identifying the remains, bury the remains respectfully or 
transport the remains back to Norway. As the remains are located in Russia such physical 
measures will have to be employed by Russia or with some sort of Russian cooperation. 
Likewise, the return of the remains to Norway will necessarily entail some sort of cooperation 
by the Norwegian authorities. 
 
                                                 
111 I Geneva Convention Article 1. 
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Secondly the States have the possibility of acting in accordance with the obligations 
indirectly, through the support of other States or entities’ undertakings. For example we have 
seen that the obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead and prevent them from being 
despoiled can be fulfilled by making arrangements for teams or humanitarian organisations to 
search for and recover the dead from the battlefield area. Also an obligation to ‘ensure’ the 
identification of the dead can be fulfilled through enabling other entities to perform the 
obligation. The obligation to dispose of the dead in a respectful manner is also formulated as 
an obligation to ‘ensure’ that this is done and should thus be fulfilled where this is undertaken 
by private or public initiatives financed or in other manner supported by the States. When it 
comes to the obligation to endeavour to facilitate the return of the remains and to return the 
personal effects of the deceased, making sure that the task is completed by another State or 
entity must be construed as facilitating. As regards the obligation to return personal effects of 
the deceased, this is an obligation of result which entails that the obligation can be performed 
in any manner as long as the result is achieved.  
 
Thirdly the States can be acting in accordance with the obligations regarding the dead through 
political measures. These measures may comprise of the enabling of the task to be fulfilled 
through cooperation and the entering into agreements with the host State or others that 
undertake to fulfil the tasks. A political measure may also involve applying political pressure 
to make sure other States act in conformity with their obligations.  
4.2 Relevant activities 2007 - 2010 
4.2.1 Actions by the Kaprolat Committee 
Since its establishment, the Kaprolat Committee has through cooperative arrangements with 
regional authorities in the Russian Karelia arranged three expeditions to the Kaprolat and 
Hasselmann area. These expeditions have led to the locating of the remains of approximately 
70 individuals which have been transported and temporarily deposited in war memorial areas. 
Of these 70 individuals, 13 match DNA samples given from the Norwegian soldiers’ families. 
These families have been given the choice of having the remains returned with assistance, but 
no financial support, of the Norwegian governments. The next of kin of at least three of the 
identified soldiers have chosen this option. Alternatively the identified remains are to be 
buried by the German War Grave Service (Volksbund) in German war yards.  
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4.2.2 The Norwegian government’s actions 
In 2007, succeeding a shift in Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to give 
consular help to those who wish to return the remains of their relatives to Norway or have 
them buried in Russia by the German War Grave Service, as well as administrative help to the 
next of kin in contact with Russian and German authorities. The consular assistance consists 
of the Norwegian foreign services tending to the formalities and paper work entailed to 
bringing a deceased out of a foreign country. The foreign services also organise the 
transportation.112
 
 It seems as the Norwegian authorities through this assistance are acting in 
accordance with the obligation to facilitate the return of the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers’ 
remains as well as the obligation to ensure that the dead are disposed of in a respectful 
manner. 
The Ministry also granted some financial support to the Kaprolat committee to fund DNA 
identification and field studies. The expressed goals were to enable the families to see to that 
the remains of their relatives are buried or returned to Norway, and to make sure that no more 
remains are left out in the open.113
 
 It can be argued that Norway, by their support of the 
Kaprolat committee, is acting in accordance with the obligation to search, collect and 
evacuate the dead and prevent them from being despoiled. The State must take ‘all possible 
measures’ in this regard. This must be interpreted as all measures that can be reasonably 
expected, taking both cost and certainty of outcome into consideration. Seeing that the 
remains are left on a foreign State’s territory, it seems probable that assisting a non-profit 
committee in undertaking this task is one of few measures available to the Norwegian 
authorities and that Norway thus is acting in accordance with this obligation. 
Moreover, it seems that Norway, by their support of the Kaprolat project, is acting in 
accordance with the obligations with a view to identifying the dead by ‘ensure[ing]’ 
examination, DNA testing and that available information is recorded. 
                                                 
112 The assistance is strictly administrative and relatives requesting the remains returned have to cover the costs 
themselves. The assistance is the same generally given to the relatives of Norwegian nationals who die abroad. 
113 Svar på skriftlig spørsmål om nordmenn i tysk tjeneste ved Østfronten. Available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/svar_stortinget/sporretime/2007/oestfronten.html?id=494380 
[Accessed 26 October 2010]. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, stresses that all the assistance 
given with regard to the remains in Russian Karelia is given out of humanitarian considerations. He also refers to 
the memo from 2005, concluding that there is no legal obligation for the Norwegian authorities to give 
assistance. 
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4.2.3 Actions by the Russian and German authorities 
The Russian authorities have remained passive with concern to the remains of the Norwegian 
Waffen SS volunteers. The Soviet forces left the dead soldiers on the battlefield in 1944 and 
nothing indicates that the Soviet or Russian authorities have commenced anything in this 
regard since. On the contrary, the Russian bureaucracy has made it difficult for the Kaprolat 
committee to get in touch with the right authorities to get the permissions needed to undertake 
its field studies. The Committee has only been able to enter into agreements with regional 
authorities. Hence, it would seem that Russia is not acting in conformity with its obligations 
regarding the dead under international humanitarian law. 
 
German authorities seem to assume responsibility when it comes to the burial of the 
Norwegian SS volunteers. Through the German war graves service (Volksbund), Norwegian 
SS soldiers who died at Kaprolat/Hasselmann have been buried in German war yards. 
Germany is thus acting in accordance with the obligation to ensure that the dead are disposed 
of in a respectful manner. Volksbund have, however, first attended to the burial after the 
remains have been collected and identified by the Kaprolat committee. Nothing indicates that 
Volksbund or other German initiatives themselves have done anything to evacuate the 
remains of the soldiers or have them identified. It would thus seem that Germany is not acting 
in accordance with the obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead and the obligations 
with a view to identifying the dead. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis has been to identify and clarify the obligations international 
humanitarian law poses on Russia, Germany and Norway regarding the remains of the 
Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers who died during combat actions in the Russian Karelia in 
1944.  
 
International humanitarian law poses specific obligations on the parties to an armed conflict 
concerning soldiers who die on the battlefield during the conflict. As parties to the Second 
World War, Russia, Germany and Norway are subjects to such obligations regarding the 
Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers who died on the battlefield in the Kaprolat/Hasselmann area in 
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June 1944. Since the remains of the soldiers have not been repatriated, these obligations have 
not ceased to exist as a result of the termination of the war in 1945.  
 
The respective States have by remaining passive omitted to act in accordance with their 
obligations from the date the soldiers died in 1944 until at least 2007. However, the 
international humanitarian law obligations cannot be construed as being absolute. 
Consequently, it is possible that the difficult relationship between the States, as well as the 
political situation within the States, would made it unreasonably burdensome for the States to 
act with regard to the soldiers during the remaining year of the war and the years following its 
termination. However, for as long as it has been possible and proportionate for the States to 
act in accordance with the obligations, Russia, Germany and Norway have been responsible 
for a continuing wrongful act. This entails that also obligations and sources of IHL entered 
into before the continuing omission ceased are applicable. Consequently, the IHL obligations 
as they are construed today, substantially based on the I Geneva Convention (1949), the I 
Protocol (1977) and customary international humanitarian law, are applicable with regard to 
the remains of the Norwegian Waffen SS soldiers. 
 
The obligation to search, collect and evacuate the dead and prevent them from being 
despoiled requires the respective States to take ‘every possible measure’ in this regard. This 
must be interpreted as every possible and proportionate measure. The obligation may be 
fulfilled through making arrangements for teams. The Norwegian authorities have since 2007 
financed the Kaprolat Committees’ undertaking to locate and identify the remains and have 
thus been acting in accordance with this obligation. Russia and Germany, on their side, have 
failed to employ any measures in order to fulfil the obligation. Conversely, the Russian 
authorities have made it difficult for the Kaprolat project to get the necessary permissions and 
agreements.  
 
The States have to ensure that all available information that can lead to the identification of 
the soldiers is recorded. The States should ensure DNA testing where the costs and 
uncertainties of such tests do not override the families’ right to know the fate of their relatives 
and the general humanitarian advantage of persons being put to a final rest in a marked grave.  
Russian and German authorities have remained completely passive and have thus not been 
acting in accordance with the obligation. Norway, on the other hand, has acted in accordance 
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with the obligation through ensuring DNA testing and that available information has been 
recorded by supporting the Kaprolat project.  
 
Russia, Germany and Norway are also obligated to ensure that the remains of the Norwegian 
Waffen SS soldiers are disposed of in a respectful manner. German authorities have by 
supporting the German War Grave Service’s initiative to bury the soldiers seemed willing to 
ensure that this obligation is fulfilled. The same can be said for Norway through helping the 
soldiers’ next of kin in contact with the German War Grave Service. Through the work of the 
Kaprolat Committee the Norwegian authorities have also ensured that the remains are placed 
appropriately in war memorial areas before burial. The Russian authorities have conversely 
remained passive. Their omission to act with regard to the dead is not in conformity with the 
obligation to dispose of the dead in a respectful manner. 
 
The parties to the conflict have to endeavour to facilitate the return of the remains to Norway 
on the request of the soldiers’ next of kin. The States act in accordance with this obligation 
when they make an effort to assist the progress of such repatriation. On the request from the 
soldiers’ next of kin, Norwegian authorities have offered to tend to the formalities connected 
to the return of the remains of the soldiers from Russia to Norway. The Norwegian authorities 
are thus prepared to assist the progress of the return and have already done so with regard to 
at least three individuals. Hence, Norway is acting in accordance with this obligation. When it 
comes to the Russian and German authorities, nothing indicates that their obligations in this 
regard have been triggered by a request from the soldiers’ next of kin. Their passivity is 
therefore not contradictory to the obligation. 
 
The obligation to return the deceased soldiers’ personal effects to their next of kin is an 
obligation of result. The fact that the soldiers’ personal effects are in fact not returned, should 
entail that the three States have not acted in accordance with this obligation. However, as a 
result of the years gone by and of the scavengers who have been in the area, it might no 
longer be possible to find personal effects on the dead. If this is the case, the States can no 
longer be obligated to return the personal effects as the obligation cannot be construed as 
going further than what is possible and proportionate.  
 
For as long as there still are remains left in the Kaprolat/Hasselmann area, which have not 
been evacuated, returned, buried or identified, and fulfilment of these tasks entails no more 
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than possible and proportionate measures, the States are obligated to undertake such 
measures. Due to the limited enforcement mechanisms in international humanitarian law, the 
challenge is for the States themselves to make certain that they are fulfilling their obligations. 
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